

66, 236 A.2d 151. Thus, in *Wharton* we concluded that ¹³³²for "all intents and purposes the insolvency of the insurance company has caused the removal or withdrawal of liability insurance coverage for plaintiffs' claim against the tortfeasor. . . ." *Id.* Hence we held that the insolvency of defendant's carrier was a "disclaimer" for purposes of *N.J.S.A.* 39:6-65(b). *Id.* at 67, 236 A.2d 151. Other exceptions or caveats have been developed by judicial decision to enlarge the 90 day requirement. See *Giacobbe v. Gassert, supra*; see also *Wilkins v. Smith*, 181 *N.J.Super.* 121, 124-126, 436 A.2d 951 (App.Div.1981); *Moore v. Truesdale*, 48 *N.J.Super.* 257, 137 A.2d 433 (App. Div.1958) (accident during injured plaintiff's infancy).

We agree with the holding of *Parrot* because there defendant had no coverage prior to or at the time of the accident. Here, however, it is undisputed that there was coverage prior to the accident, and that it was terminated for non-payment of a premium. Nevertheless, as of the time of the accident, defendant continued to possess an insurance identification card which permitted plaintiff and his attorney reasonably to believe there was coverage as of the date of the accident. To require every automobile accident victim to file a notice with the Fund within 90 days of the accident merely to avoid the possibility that the insurance coverage had been terminated between the time the card was issued and the date of the accident would put an unreasonable burden on the victim and an equally unreasonable administrative expense on the Fund. *Parrot* and *Danisi, supra*, decided before adoption of both our "No Fault" and Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance laws, see *N.J.S.A.* 39:6A-1 *et seq.*; *N.J.S.A.* 39:6B-1 *et seq.*, involved no required identification card on which the innocent victim could rely in terms of ascertaining if there was, in fact, coverage at the time of the accident. See *N.J.S.A.* 39:6B-2. And here the police investigation report indicated, by reference to the same card, the existence of coverage.

[3] Under the circumstances where the plaintiff relied upon the police report incor-

porating the name of a carrier and ¹³³³indicating insurance coverage, we affirm the conclusion that there has been timely notice to the Fund. However, under the same set of circumstances, we also believe that the Fund's motion to vacate default (denied by another judge prior to the proceedings before Judge Supnick) should have been granted, so that the Fund has the opportunity to investigate the claim and defend on the merits. There was a good faith contest at the time regarding whether the requirements of initial notice and of notice to "the board of any action thereafter instituted for enforcement of such claim," *N.J.S.A.* 39:6-65, was timely given. While the Fund before us has properly and commendably indicated the absence of any factual dispute concerning the date on which notice was received by it in June, 1987, it has not abandoned its claim that default should be vacated because of the dispute regarding other subsequent statutory notices or because its conduct was in good faith. Under the circumstances, we affirm Judge Supnick's order upholding the notice to the Fund as timely, but reverse the prior order of another judge denying the Fund the opportunity to vacate the default.

We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.



255 N.J.Super. 333

¹³³³In the Matter of PROSECUTOR OF
MIDDLESEX COUNTY, Respondent-
Appellant,

and

PBA Local 214, Middlesex County Prose-
cutor's Detectives and Investigators,
Charging Party-Respondent.

Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division.

Submitted Jan. 14, 1992.

Decided April 8, 1992.

Prosecutor's office appealed from a final decision of the Public Employment Re-

lations Commission (PERC) holding that ¹³³⁴the office violated the Employer-Employee Relations Act by unilaterally rescinding credits that had been granted to newly hired employees for longevity and vacation and sick leave benefits based on prior governmental employment. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, Thomas, J.S.C., temporarily assigned, held that the prosecutor's office was a separate public employer from the county board of freeholders and, therefore, a freeholders' resolution rescinding prior service credits did not relieve the prosecutor's office of its obligation to negotiate rescission of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.

Decision affirmed.

Labor Relations ⇄177

County prosecutor was separate public employer from county board of freeholders and was obligated to negotiate rescission of credits granted to newly hired employees based on prior governmental employment, even though county freeholders had rescinded resolution granting prior service credit; although prosecutor claimed that he was obligated to carry out freeholders' mandate in rescinding credit, prosecutor's authority to run his office made him separate employer and obligated him to negotiate any change in existing collective bargaining agreement. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et seq., 34:13A-5.4, subd. a(1, 5).

John J. Hoagland, Middlesex County Counsel, for respondent-appellant (Edward J. Santoro, Jr., on the brief).

Zazzali, Zazzali, Fagella & Nowak, for charging party-respondent (Paul L. Kleinbaum, on the brief).

Robert E. Anderson, Gen. Counsel for respondent, Public Employment Relations Com'n (Don Horowitz, Deputy Gen. Counsel, on the brief).

1. *Kenney* held that the statute, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-5, violated the bar against "special legislation." *Id.* at 52-53. However, the issue of granting credit for prior governmental service remained subject to negotiation. See *City of Paterson v. Paterson*

Before Judges ANTELL, BAIME and THOMAS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

¹³³⁵THOMAS, J.S.C., temporarily assigned.

The Prosecutor of Middlesex County appeals from a decision of the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) holding that appellant was in violation of the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act and ordering remedial action. After a careful review of the record, we agree PERC correctly applied the Act and affirm.

On June 1, 1989, PBA Local 214, Middlesex County Prosecutor's Detectives and Investigators filed an unfair practice charge against appellant with PERC. Respondent alleged that appellant violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1, et seq., specifically subsections 5.4(a)(1) and (a)(5), when it unilaterally stopped granting newly-hired employees credit for longevity and vacation and sick leave benefits based on prior governmental employment.

Since the early 1970s, appellant's employees have been entitled to credit for prior governmental service. The credit was used to calculate vacation and sick leave allowances and longevity payments. Until 1980, the credit was mandated by statute. However, we declared the statute unconstitutional in *Kenney v. East Brunswick Tp.*, 172 N.J.Super. 45, 410 A.2d 713 (App.Div. 1980).¹ The County then passed a new resolution on September 18, 1980 again granting credit for prior governmental service to appellant's employees which was incorporated into the 1980-1981 agreement between appellant and respondent.

On July 24, 1987, respondent filed a grievance alleging that appellant had violated the collective agreement by failing to provide the prior service credit to certain employees. This ¹³³⁶grievance was based on claims that some employees were hired without being given prior service credit and

Police P.B.A. Local # 1, 184 N.J.Super. 591, 598-599, 446 A.2d 1244 (App.Div.1982), *appeal dismissed*, 93 N.J. 320, 460 A.2d 710 (1983) (where we confirmed a post-*Kenney* arbitration award granting credit for prior governmental service).

some were given less credit than they thought they deserved. An arbitration hearing was held on January 4, 1988, and on January 25, 1988, the arbitrator issued an award. The award included the finding that appellant must grant the credit, pursuant to the 1980 resolution and bargaining agreement. This award was appealed and affirmed. On February 27, 1989, the parties entered into a written agreement to implement the arbitrator's award which included calculations for specific employees of retroactive vacation and sick days as well as longevity payments.

The 1980 provision was carried over into the 1988-1989 collective agreement as article 20:

XX. SAVINGS CLAUSE

It is mutually understood and agreed that all benefits currently enjoyed by employees shall remain in effect and become a part of this Agreement, including any and all verbal or written agreements pertaining to working conditions made with the Middlesex County Prosecutor.

It is agreed that all general fringe benefits given to all other County employees by General County Policy, will also be granted to the employees covered by this Agreement.

The second paragraph of Article 21 of the parties' 1980-1981 collective agreement is identical to the second paragraph of Article 20 of the 1988-1989 agreement.

On March 16, 1989, the County passed a resolution prospectively rescinding the 1980 resolution granting the prior service credit. Appellant implemented this resolution without first negotiating the rescission of the credit with respondent.

After filing the unfair practice charge, the parties attempted to settle their differences without success. A formal complaint was filed and appellant answered contending it had the right to stop granting credit and that no employees had lost any benefits. A hearing examiner, after review, issued his report and recommendations. He found appellant violated *N.J.S.A.* 133734:13A-5.4(a)(1) and (a)(5) when it unilat-

erally stopped granting newly hired employees credit for prior governmental service.

On August 15, 1990, PERC issued its decision incorporating the hearing examiner's findings and conclusions. PERC ordered appellant to reinstate the credit for prior employees represented by respondent, apply credit to all eligible members and negotiate with respondent regarding any future attempts to rescind credit.

The hearing examiner found that the credit was negotiable between the appellant and respondent and said:

Here the credit directly affects the employees' welfare, was not fully or partially preempted, and negotiations would not have significantly interfered with the determination of governmental policy. The County's purpose for passing the March resolution "in the public interest" was economic. The Prosecutor unilaterally implemented that resolution but offered no evidence or argument to suggest that such implementation was necessary to deliver its governmental services. Rather, the facts show that the dominant concern here was economic, and changes made in employee benefits for economic reasons must be negotiated with the majority representative prior to implementation. See *Piscataway Tp. Bd. Ed. v. Piscataway Tp. Principals Assoc.*, 164 *N.J.Super.* 98, 101 [395 A.2d 880] (App. Div.1978); *Sayreville Bd. Ed.*, P.E.R.C. No. 83-105, 9 *NJPER* 138, 141 (¶ 14066 1983).

In addition, PERC held:

In March 1989, the Freeholder Board passed a resolution rescinding its 1980 resolution granting employees credit for prior governmental service. The Prosecutor had granted prior credit in conformity with the 1980 resolution and unilaterally ended that practice in conformity with the 1989 resolution. The Freeholder Board's action may have motivated the employer's action, but it did not preempt its obligation to negotiate before changing terms and conditions of employment. See *State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n.*, 78 *N.J.* 54 [393 A.2d 233] (1978) (only statutes and regu-

lations preempt negotiations); *City of Vineland*, P.E.R.C. No. 90-105, 16 *NJPER* 317 (¶ 21130 1990) (ordinances do not preempt).

The unfair labor practice was appellant's failure to maintain terms and conditions of employment, a violation of *N.J.S.A.* 34:13A-5.4(a)(1) and (a)(5), which state:

a. Public employers, their representatives or agents are prohibited from:

(1) Interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by this act.

....
 1338(5) Refusing to negotiate in good faith with a majority representative of employees in an appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment of employees in that unit, or refusing to process grievances presented by the majority representative.

Thus, PERC ordered appellant to reinstate the credit.

It is appellant's contention that its action was required in order to carry out the mandate of the March 1989 Freeholder Board resolution rescinding credit. This mandate by the Freeholders, in effect, directed appellant to breach a term of an existing agreement between appellant and its employees. Appellant further contends it cannot negotiate a change in credit because to do so would place it in violation of the Freeholder Board's decree. In doing so, appellant relies upon *N.J.S.A.* 40:20-1, which states in its first paragraph:

The property, finances and affairs of every county shall be managed, controlled and governed by a board elected therein, to be known as "the board of chosen freeholders of the county of (specifying name of county)", and the executive and legislature powers of the county shall be vested in that board of chosen freeholders, except where by law any specific powers or duties are imposed or vested in a Constitutional officer.

Appellant maintains that powers reserved for the freeholders cannot be usurped by any other board or official, including appellant.

However, appellant fits into the exception found in the statute. Appellant, as a county prosecutor, is a Constitutional officer. See *N.J. Const. of 1947* art. VII, § 2, para. 1. Relevant is *N.J.S.A.* 2A:158-7, which states:

All necessary expenses incurred by the prosecutor for each county in the detection, arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders against the laws shall, upon being certified to by the prosecutor and approved, under his hand, by a judge of the superior court or of the county court for such county, be paid by the county treasurer whenever the same shall be approved by the board of chosen freeholders of such county. The amount or amounts to be expended shall not exceed the amount fixed by the board of chosen freeholders in its regular or emergency appropriation, unless such expenditure is specifically authorized by order of the assignment judge of the superior court for such county.

Thus, this statute gives appellant the power to seek funding above the appropriation allocated by the freeholders, which could include funding for the credit. This is contrary to appellant's³³⁹ statement: "The Prosecutor cannot create financial fringe benefits for his employees".

We were previously confronted with this problem in *In re Mercer Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Mercer Cty. Prosecutor*, 172 *N.J. Super.* 411, 412 *A.2d* 809 (App. Div. 1980). In that case, the Teamsters Union filed a petition with PERC, seeking a certification that it was the representative of clerical, stenographic and technical employees of the Mercer County Prosecutor. PERC determined that the prosecutor, rather than the county board of chosen freeholders, was the public employer for the purpose of collective negotiations under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act. *Id.* at 413, 412 *A.2d* 809. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating:

[P]rosecutors are authorized by statute to incur necessary expenses in the conduct of their offices and if the freeholders do not honor the prosecutor's certification of his expenses they may be ordered to pay the sums authorized by the

Cite as 605 A.2d 269 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1992)

assignment judge for the county. *N.J.S.A.* 2A:158[-]7, saved from repeal by *N.J.S.A.* 2C:98[-]3. See, also, *N.J.S.A.* 2A:157[-]18 and [-]19. The language of the statute indicates a legislative intent to place the prosecutor in a dominant position with relation to the freeholders for the purpose of maintaining his independence and effectiveness. *In re Application of Bigley*, 55 *N.J.* 53, 56 [259 A.2d 213] (1969).

Id., 172 *N.J.Super.* at 413-414, 412 A.2d 809.

Thus, appellant is actually a separate employer from the freeholders, and as a separate public employer, it is appellant who must negotiate with respondent. As the public employer, appellant has the duty under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, *N.J.S.A.* 34:13A-1, *et seq.*, to, among other responsibilities, maintain terms and conditions of employment and to bargain in good faith with respondent. Since appellant failed to negotiate any change in the existing agreement with respondent, rescinding the credit was an illegal unilateral change.

Thus, appellant's argument that it had no alternative but to implement the resolution is incorrect. His specific powers and duties to run his office place him "in the dominant position with ¹³⁴⁰relation to the freeholders for the purpose of maintaining his independence and effectiveness."

The PERC decision is affirmed.



255 *N.J.Super.* 340

¹³⁴⁰STATE of New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

G.B., Defendant-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division.

Argued March 17, 1992.

Decided April 9, 1992.

Commissioner of Department of Corrections moved before sentencing court for

modification of period of parole ineligibility originally imposed upon sex offender committed to Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC). The Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County, imposed a ten year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, Baime, J.A.D., held that: (1) defendant has no right to be present at hearing on motion filed by Commissioner but his attorney should be permitted to attend and present argument, and (2) in determining whether to modify parole ineligibility term imposed on sex offender, sentencing court should reevaluate statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in light of recommendation and report of Commissioner.

Order denying modification reversed and matter remanded.

¹³⁴¹1. Criminal Law ⇐987, 988

Defendant has no right to be present at hearing on motion filed by Commissioner of Department of Corrections for modification of period of parole ineligibility originally imposed upon sex offender committed to Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC), but his attorney should be permitted to attend and present argument. *N.J.S.A.* 2C:47-4, subd. c.

2. Criminal Law ⇐996(2)

Motion for modification of sentence imposed upon sex offender committed to Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC) falls within purview of rule allowing Law Division to change sentence at any time when authorized by Code of Criminal Justice. R. 3:21-10(b)(4).

3. Criminal Law ⇐987

Decision of whether to grant defendant's request to be present in ruling on motion of Commissioner of Department of Corrections for modification of period of parole ineligibility originally imposed upon sex offender committed to Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC) is a mat-